活動預告, 最新消息 | July 15th, 2010 |

(Seminar conducted in Cantonese)

講者:黃鶴回 (中文大學政治與行政學系助理教授)

日期:2010 年7月29日(星期四)

時間:晚上7:30 – 8:30

地點:公共專 業聯盟辦事處

灣仔道133號 星航資訊 中心 10樓A室

內容:

  1. 研究背景
  2. 研究時遇上的挑戰
  3. 實證方法應對挑戰
  4. 論證
  5. 總結

簡報內容 : 按此下載 (ENG)

Abstract of Prof. Wong’s Research

Business interests are over-represented in Hong Kong’s nominally democratic political institutions. Many in Hong Kong perceive this as evidence of the existence of “collusion between government and business (guanshang goujie)," a phenomenon that has stirred public concerns in the city since its sovereignty transfer. Although anecdotal accounts abound, no systematic analysis has been conducted to evaluate the validity of this perception. In this paper, I use a rich firm-level dataset to offer the first systematic assessment of the effects of political connections on firm performance in Hong Kong. I define politically connected firms as firms that have shareholders or directors concurrently holding a seat in the Election Committee, a constitutional body that elects the city’s chief executive every five years. The evidence that I find, though not overwhelming, are consistent with the “collusion" hypothesis. In particular, the data show that political connections do improve firm performance measured by return on equity and market-to-book ratio. I also find within-group variations among the politically connected firms; political connections benefit firms that belong to the business constituency of the Election more than those associated with other constituencies. As for the origin of the political connections, the data show that a firm’s economic power has little predictive value of its connections to the Election Committee. Rather, the numbers of employees that a firm hires matters; firms that hire fewer workers are more likely to gain a seat in the Election Committee in 1997. This result may suggest that Beijing plays a more dominant role in the formation of the political connections, which serve Beijing’s co-optation needs, rather than the interests of powerful firms that may have a desire to “capture" the state.

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