2007-10-10
A. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1. The Government has released its Green Paper on Constitutional Development (the
“Green Paper”) in July 2007. It is seeking submissions from the public on the issues
raised in the paper, which deals with the future electoral arrangements for the post of
the Chief Executive (“CE”) and for the Legislative Council (“LegCo”).
2. This paper sets out our position in relation to the proposals set out in the Green Paper.
Although the Green Paper has set out a number of specific questions to which the
Government invites response, we will not deal with the issues in accordance with
those questions. This is because the questions appear to reduce the whole
consultation process to a “box ticking” exercise, whereby respondents are expected no
more than to be a “statistic” on specific mechanisms, rather than providing
opportunities for dealing with similarly important issues of principle.
3. Against this background, this paper will be divided into the following sections:
3.1. “Universal suffrage – what is it?”;
3.2. “Universal suffrage – Hong Kong is ready”;
3.3. “Models for CE elections by universal suffrage”;
3.4. “Models for LegCo elections by universal suffrage”; and
3.5. “Hong Kong: it’s time”.
4. In dealing with these issues, we have deliberately not taken a highly technical,
legalistic approach. We believe that whilst, as professionals, we must not avoid
altogether the technical questions in our analysis, Hong Kong’s political system does
not belong only to businessmen, professionals and other alleged “elites”. It would be
contrary to the spirit of our advocacy for the earliest possible attainment of universal
suffrage if we were to produce an overly technical document that is intended merely
for an “elite” audience.
5. As regards our position on the issues raised, they are, in summary:
5.1. There are no legal impediments to the election of the CE and LegCo at any
time after 2007 (in the case of CE) or 2008 (in the case of LegCo). Against
this background, Hong Kong is not only ready for universal suffrage as soon
as possible, but that the actual situation in Hong Kong makes such a move
essential.
5.2. Thus, the CE and LegCo should be elected through genuine universal suffrage
by 2012. Hong Kong is more than ready for this.
5.3. As regards CE elections, a nomination committee should in principle be
formed in a democratic manner so as to represent the public in the broadest
possible way. However, as a practical option we also support minimal change
to the present composition of the nomination committee; it may either remain
unchanged with 800 members, or be expanded to around 1200 through the
addition of directly elected District Councillors On this basis, the nomination
threshold for an eligible CE candidate should be no more stringent than the
present arrangement, requiring the support of 100 or less Election Committee
members.
5.4. As with LegCo, we are of the view that functional constituencies (“FCs”)
should be abolished in their entirety. Any retention of FCs is not only
undesirable for Hong Kong in light of its actual situation, but is against the
principle of genuine universal suffrage.
6. Before proceeding to explain our position in more detail, we wish to make clear our
fundamental rationale for our advocacy of early and genuine universal suffrage:
6.1. Strictly speaking, as a group of professionals, most of us are currently in the
privileged position of being able to vote for Election Committee candidates, as
well as having our own FC members within LegCo. This puts us in a
privileged position. In that regard, it is clearly in our personal interests for the
present electoral system to be maintained.
6.2. However, for reasons that will be outlined in this paper, we are very firmly of
the opinion the present electoral system is untenable. As professionals
exercising independent judgments, we believe that it would be inappropriate
for us to adopt a narrow, elitist line on issues of public interest such as this.
After all, no single person, however educated, qualified or experienced, can
claim any monopoly over wisdom on what is best for Hong Kong.
6.3. Thus, rather than hoarding privilege and power for ourselves, we believe that
professionals should embrace and engage with the public so that we can learn
from each other. And the best way for achieving this would be through an
open electoral system where everyone gets to have a say in Hong Kong’s
governance.
7. On this basis, we now proceed to explain our position in more detail.
B. UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE – WHAT IS IT?
8. In the Green Paper, the Government devoted an entire chapter discussing the concept
of universal suffrage and the factors relevant to its meaning. We will examine these
in turn and point out where we believe the Government appears to be attempting to
confuse the issue.
Starting point – Hong Kong is entitled to universal suffrage
9. Without defining what universal suffrage involves, the Green Papers refers to the fact
that under the Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law, Hong Kongers are ultimately
entitled to electing the CE and LegCo by universal suffrage.
10. We welcome the fact that the Government is at least willing to continue
acknowledging this fact.
11. However, we disagree with the Government’s position that Hong Kongers’ right to
enjoy universal suffrage is derived from the Basic Law alone. Article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), a document that is
incorporated into Hong Kong law by Article 39 of the Basic Law, states clearly that
every citizen has the right “to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage”.
12. The Green Paper sought to suggest that this right is not incorporated into the laws of
Hong Kong, because of a 1976 reservation by the then colonial power to exclude the
application of this part of the ICCPR to Hong Kong. We believe that the
Government’s suggestion is wrong on a number of fronts:
12.1. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which acts as a monitor for
territories’ compliance with the ICCPR, clearly considers the reservation not
to apply in Hong Kong any longer. It has, over the years since reunification in
1997, consistently pointed out that Hong Kong’s electoral system is
inconsistent with the ICCPR right to universal suffrage.
12.2. Further, even if one were to take a slightly more technical view, the
reservation in question applied only “in so far as it may require the
establishment of an elected Executive or Legislative Council in Hong Kong”.
Thus, the Government has clearly taken the reservation out of context. The
fact is that once an electoral mechanism of sorts had been established in Hong
Kong for both CE and LegCo, there is no reason why such a mechanism does
not have to conform with the ICCPR.
13. Whilst this issue might be seen as one of purely technical legal interest, it is
instructive as to the way the Green Paper had been put together to cloud rather than to
clarify issues. The issues are analysed by the Government in a way which creates the
impression that Hong Kong’s entitlement to universal suffrage seem narrower in
scope than it actually is. We will, throughout the course of this and other sections,
examine these obfuscations, and seek to debunk them one by one.
What is universal suffrage?
14. In chapter two of the Green Paper, the Government sought to explain its
understanding of what constitutes universal suffrage. Given that political reforms in
Hong Kong centres around the achievement of this goal for CE and LegCo elections,
the meaning of the term is of fundamental importance.
15. Unfortunately, the Government saw fit to leave this analysis to the end of the chapter.
Instead, there was an attempt to include additional factors and concepts before this
analysis as apparently relevant considerations as to what constitutes universal
suffrage. By contrast, we believe that it is most important to make clear from the
outset what we mean by universal suffrage.
16. Broadly speaking, we agree with the Government’s position as to the components of
universal suffrage. They include:
16.1. the requirement of the right of citizens to vote in elections for political
representatives;
16.2. such a right must not be limited in any way by reference to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status;
16.3. universal suffrage implies both “universal” and “equal” representation;
16.4. any system of universal suffrage should conform with international standards;
but
16.5. there is a range of systems which would be consistent with the concept of
universal suffrage. In particular, the right to “equal” votes does not imply the
need for a strict numerical equality.
17. Whilst we believe that these are all valid features of one’s right to vote for political
representatives, they are not, in themselves, sufficient. The fundamental rationale for
any system of universal suffrage is to try and ensure “democratic” government. In
perhaps overly simplified terms, this means essentially that any elected government
would broadly reflect the society’s political orientation at a given time. Thus, any
system of universal suffrage designed to undermine this principle would also
undermine universal suffrage itself. This calls the genuineness of such a process into
question.
18. As such, in order for universal suffrage to be “real”, we believe that the overall
electoral system must be such that:
18.1. Fair constituencies : the electoral constituencies must not be formed in such a
way as to favour intentionally any political group. Whilst, by economic
demographics, different geographical areas would tend to favour certain
political groups, the system must not be tailored specifically to ensure that
such groups will win any territory-wide elections overall.
18.2. Fair candidate nomination procedures : the right for voters to become
candidates for election is also of great importance. Whilst both pragmatism
and the Basic Law provide for the need for procedures to nominate candidates,
such procedures must not be discriminatory in nature so as to limit unduly the
range of choices available to voters.
18.3. Fair voting : each voter’s ballot should (subject only to moderate discrepancies
due to the impracticality of drawing constituencies of exactly the same size),
to the maximum extent possible, have approximately equal value.
19. We are of the opinion that these factors are essential in order to make universal
suffrage “real”. Without these conditions, any purported system of universal suffrage
risks being no more than acting as a popular “rubber stamp” for incumbent
governments and politicians.
The role of the Central People’s Government
20. As noted earlier, rather than going straight to discussing the components of universal
suffrage, the Green Paper had sought to create distractions by introducing seemingly
but not actually pertinent factors to what constitutes universal suffrage. The first and
foremost factor discussed in the Green Paper is that the concept of universal suffrage
must be considered in the context of Hong Kong being part of the China, which is a
unitary state. Thus, matters relating to Hong Kong’s political system are ultimately
matters for the Central People’s Government, and the progress towards universal
suffrage is no exception.
21. We acknowledge that as a matter of legal and political reality, the Central People’s
Government is the final arbiter of Hong Kong’s political development. However, this
does not mean that the concept of universal suffrage is somehow affected by that fact.
Instead, the concept should be considered objectively, which in turn will involve an
examination of the rationale for universal suffrage and widely accepted international
practices.
22. To support Hong Kong’s status as an international city, we encourage the Central
Government to openly acknowledge the need for Hong Kong to follow international
best practice in universal suffrage, including the provisions in the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. We believe it is unfortunate for the
Government to choose to blur the issues by making questions of political process part
of wider definitional questions.
The Government’s alleged principles for universal suffrage
23. In addition to the reference to the Central People’s Government, the Green Paper
suggests further that any notion of universal suffrage in Hong Kong must bear in mind
the following four factors:
23.1. meeting the interests of different sectors of society;
23.2. facilitating the development of a capitalist economy;
23.3. gradual and orderly progress; and
23.4. appropriate to Hong Kong’s actual situation.
24. Of these four factors, we note the following:
24.1. The first two of the factors are not in fact any particular legal and institutional
requirements at all. Instead, they are apparently deduced from comments
made by the chairman of the Basic Law drafting committee. To that end, we
believe that:
(a) At most, these notions are no more than factors to bear in mind when
designing the specific system for achieving universal suffrage in Hong
Kong. As with the question of the Central People Government’s role,
these factors do not go to the fundamental question of what constitutes
universal suffrage. This is yet another attempt by the Government to
insert purely procedural/political elements into the concept of universal
suffrage.
(b) Even if, contrary to the above, these factors are somehow relevant at a
more conceptual level, we are firmly of the view that, in any event
these factors are best promoted if Hong Kong enjoys an internationally
recognised system of universal suffrage. After all, a political system
that allows the widest possible public participation should (assuming
that it is otherwise fairly structured, as will be discussed later in this
chapter), on average, be a better representation of different interests in
society than a system that favours particular groups. In addition,
international experience strongly suggests that countries with thriving
capitalist economies almost inevitably also have representative
government returned by universal suffrage. Conversely, countries
without such open political mechanisms tend also to less marketoriented.
24.2. As for the latter two factors, they are found in Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic
Law, and will be analysed further in the next section of this paper. For present
purposes, it suffices to note that these factors go merely to the question of
timing for achieving universal suffrage, and not what constitutes as such.
The Government’s attempts to confuse
25. In essence, what is clear is that the Government has sought to cloud the issue by
inserting additional seemingly salient points which are in fact diversions at a
“principles” stage of analysis. Only after making these points did the Government see
fit to outline its views on what actually constitutes universal suffrage. We believe that
this is most inappropriate. Unfortunately, as will be noted in other sections of this
paper, we have identified many other instances of such attempts at obfuscation. It is
for this reason that we believe groups like us needed to present our positions in order
to clarify matters.
C. UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE – HONG KONG IS READY
26. Of the chapters in the Green Paper which dealt with the substance of electoral reforms
in Hong Kong, the one which dealt with the timetable for achieving universal suffrage
came last. Similarly, in the individual chapters dealing with CE and LegCo elections,
the question of timing is not dealt with at all (in the case of the chapter on CE
elections) or it comes last (in the case of the chapter on LegCo elections).
27. We believe that this is the wrong approach. Questions regarding specific electoral
mechanisms are, whilst important, pointless unless there is a sense of timing as to
when such mechanisms is intended to be implemented. As such, in this paper we
have put the question of timing to the forefront. In this section, we will explain why
Hong Kong is in fact already ready for universal suffrage, and that both in CE and
LegCo elections, this should be achieved by 2012.
Gradual and orderly progress in light of the actual situation in Hong Kong
28. As noted earlier, Articles 45 and Article 68 of the Basic Law states that CE and
LegCo elections should ultimately be conducted by universal suffrage in a “gradual
and orderly manner” and “in light of the actual situation in Hong Kong”. Further,
Annexes II and III of the Basic Law envisaged the possibility of moving to universal
suffrage in the term after the 2003 CE elections and 2004 LegCo elections. This
means that there was no requirement for Hong Kong to drift slowly towards universal
suffrage if Hong Kong is ready for it at any time after 2003/2004.
29. In addition, Article 25 of the ICCPR as applied by Article 39 of the Basic Law (as
earlier discussed) reinforces the fact that every citizen has the right to vote in elections
by “universal and equal suffrage”.
30. Taking these points together, we have no doubt that Hong Kong is already ready for
universal suffrage:
30.1. Gradual and orderly : Hong Kong has gone through a “gradual and orderly
progress” towards universal suffrage since the first direct elections for some
LegCo seats took place in 1991. The process is now sixteen years old. If that
is not “gradual and orderly”, then what is?
30.2. Actual situation : the actual situation in Hong Kong also calls for universal
suffrage of LegCo as soon as possible:
(a) Hong Kong claims to be “Asia’s World City”. A “world city” demands
world class facilities, infrastructure and systems. Only a system of
popularly elected government, which is internationally recognised as
“best practice”, is good enough for a world city.
(b) Hong Kongers are reasonable, mature and highly educated and
informed people. Over the past sixteen years, we have seen a real
awakening in Hong Kongers’ civic and political consciousness. And
we always handle political and social disputes in a peaceful manner.
Where else in the world can one find a crowd of protesters who are
consistently peaceful, patient even in extreme weather, leave no
rubbish on the floor, and even sometimes thank police officers that
they march past for keeping order? If such a population is not ready
for universal suffrage, then what is?
(c) Hong Kong prides itself on an open market economy and a wide array
of choices for consumers. The people of Hong Kong are thus well
used to making choices in most aspects of their lives. It would thus be
odd to say that they are somehow not ready to make choices about
their own governance.
(d) Some Government officials and special interest groups claim that
political parties in Hong Kong have not grown to a stage where
universal suffrage is possible. This ignores the fact that political
parties can only grow where they have the opportunity to win and
exercise political power. Thus, rather than saying that the system can
only become more open if parties become more developed, the fact is
that parties can only develop if the political system becomes more
open through universal suffrage.
(e) We have seen in recent years the explosion of judicial review
proceedings as a means to deal with politically contentious matters.
This is perhaps inevitable. Under the present system, anger over
unpopular laws and policies cannot be vented by people knowing that
there is a future opportunity to elect a new CE or a new majority in
LegCo to deal with such laws and policies. This leaves the courts as
the only other place where people can attempt to have their concerns
redressed. Universal suffrage is thus now taking on a greater urgency
to prevent a politicisation of the use of the courts by Hong Kongers.
30.3. International obligations : Hong Kong is now well overdue to meet its
international law obligations (as adopted by the Basic Law). Again, any
further delay will surely be inconsistent with Hong Kong being “Asia’s World
City”.
31. Thus, not only is Hong Kong ready for universal suffrage for CE and LegCo as soon
as possible, but it urgently needs this.
Legal impediments against universal suffrage now – but what about 2012?
32. It is clear from the above that we are firmly of the view that Hong Kong is ready and
needs universal suffrage now. It is a widely held misconception that the SCNPC
issued an interpretation of the Basic Law in 2004 which prohibits universal suffrage
for election of CE in 2007 and of LegCo in 2008. However, in 2004, the SCNPC
issued an interpretation which does not prohibit universal suffrage in 2007/2008 and
separately made a “Decision” prohibiting universal suffrage in 2007/2008. The
HKSAR and the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) is bound by an interpretation by the
SCNPC but the CFA has never ruled on the binding effect of a Decision.
33. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the 2004 interpretation which prevents the universal
suffrage of the CE and all LegCo seats in the 2012 elections for these positions/seats.
Indeed, the Government has listed universal suffrage in 2012 as an option in its Green
Paper.
34. Given the points we have outlined earlier in this section, we strongly believe that,
working within the constraints of the 2004 SCNPC interpretation, universal suffrage
for both the election of the CE and LegCo seats should and must take place by 2012.
Can universal suffrage not be phased in gradually after 2012 instead?
35. Apart from the listing of 2012 as a year in which universal suffrage can take place, the
Government has also listed the following as possibilities:
35.1. in the case of CE elections, universal suffrage in or after 2017; and
35.2. in the case of LegCo elections, universal suffrage for all seats in or after 2016.
36. Are these alternatives not acceptable?
37. We believe that they are not. Not only are there concerns as discussed earlier about
the further delaying of universal suffrage, but the proposed “phasing in” of universal
suffrage is extremely difficult to implement. Which special interest group is willing
to let itself lose a grip on its privileged status in the Election Committee (in the case
of CE elections) or functional constituencies (in the case of LegCo) and have its
influence diluted earlier than some others?
38. Thus, rather than entering into intractable arguments about how universal suffrage
should be phased in, the simplest (and legally permissible) thing to do would be to
abolish them all at once. We have already shown that such a move is consistent with
the Basic Law, our international law obligations, as well as Hong Kong’s current
needs.
Universal suffrage for Hong Kong by 2012!
39. We have made our position clear. No excuses. No confusion. Hong Kong is ready.
Hong Kong needs it. Give us universal suffrage for all elections by 2012!
D. MODELS FOR CE ELECTIONS BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
40. In earlier sections, we have dealt with the question of what constitutes real universal
suffrage, and the timing for which this should be achieved in Hong Kong. We now
turn to specific proposals for achieving universal suffrage raised in the Green Paper.
This section will deal with those relating to CE elections, whilst the next section will
focus on LegCo elections.
Nomination committee by democratic procedures
41. Article 45 of the Basic Law states that when universal suffrage is achieved for the
election, candidates for CE are to be nominated by a nomination committee. This
committee, in turn, is to be chosen through “democratic procedures”. The Green
Paper appears to identify two types of issues arising from this, which we now deal
examine.
Size and composition of the nomination committee
42. The Government appears obsessed with the question of the size and composition of
the nomination committee. In the Green Paper, this was the first and most extensively
dealt with item in its chapter on CE elections. The part in question dealt in detail with
a range of options on the number of committee members and the committee’s
composition.
43. We believe that the focus on this aspect of the Government’s focus is misplaced, and
merely has the effect of making the issue appear more complicated than it really is:
43.1. Wrong to focus on a “magic” number : the Green Paper discussed so
extensively on whether the nomination committee should have less than 800
members, 800 members or more than 800 members, that this was made to
appear a vital issue. However, we believe that the simple fact is this: whilst a
“number” must eventually be agreed for the size of the nomination committee,
it is by no means a vital issue:
(a) if the committee is chosen by “democratic procedures” in a way
intended broadly to represent the community as a whole, and if the
threshold for candidate nomination is not unduly restrictive, then
maybe even a 100-member committee will be large enough. The key
is for the committee to be sufficiently large to represent diverse
interests; but
(b) if these conditions are not satisfied, then the committee will be skewed
in composition and/or produce insufficiently diverse candidates for
Hong Kongers to vote for. In such a case, even a relatively large
committee of, say, 3000 members will not be sufficiently democratic.
43.2. Wrong to impose unnecessary conditions on committee composition : attempts
were also made in the Green Paper to link the concepts of “meeting the
interests of different sectors of society” and “facilitating the development of a
capitalist economy” to the composition of the nomination committee:
(a) As noted earlier in section B of this paper, these factors are in any
event best achieved through a truly democratic system.
(b) Nonetheless, these are not standalone requirements in relation to
nomination committee composition. All that is required is that the
committee is selected through “democratic procedures”.
44. Thus, as regards the size and composition of the nomination committee, the
Government yet again created sideshows, which results only in creating confusion and
distractions from truly relevant issue of how to ensure that the committee is formed by
democratic procedures (and thus broadly representative of the people).
Democratic procedures
45. Having discussed purely mechanical issues in relation to numbers and composition,
the Green Paper then proceeded merely to spend four paragraphs on the “electorate
base of the nomination committee”. Though this issue is of fundamental importance
which goes to the question of “democratic procedures” as required by the Basic Law,
it was treated almost as an afterthought. The Green Paper merely noted that the
current means for electing Election Committee members may be a good starting point
for considering how best to elect any nomination committee in the future.
46. We disagree with the Government’s view on this issue. To begin with, the current
Election Committee is not chosen by a broad cross-section of the community. Only a
few percent of the total Hong Kong population are eligible to vote in Election
Committee polls. Some seats are not even returned by individuals, but by so-called
“corporate” votes.
47. This means that the Election Committee is not in fact broadly representative of the
people of Hong Kong as a whole. If it is not broadly representative, then how is it
democratic? And if it is not democratic, how can it serve as a model for the selection
of nomination committee?
48. Of course, democratic procedures are not only about the voter base. After all, there
should be some semblance of equality in the value of votes to ensure that the results
are not skewed in favour of particular groups. The Green Paper was silent on this
issue.
49. So where does this leave us?
50. As a group, we are open to ideas and proposals as to how the nomination committee
can be formed by democratic procedures. Most of the proposals that are being
discussed in the public domain still maintain privileged status for specific sectors or
groups within the nomination committee. In such circumstances, we do not see how it
can be said that the nomination committee is somehow formed democratically.
51. On the other hand, we also appreciate that requiring a full popular election for a
nominating committee may be impractical, as the voting mechanism may be unduly
complex. Further, such a process would be disproportionately expensive when
compared with the limited role and function of a nomination committee.
52. Thus, in the absence of any other proposals, we support minimal change to the present
composition of the nomination committee – it may either remain changed at around
800 members, or may be expanded to around 1200 with the addition of all the directly
elected District Councillors.
.Nomination of CE candidates
53. As with the size and the composition of the nomination committee, the Government
tried to turn the question of the nomination of CE candidates into a warped numerical
exercise. The nomination thresholds and sector-specific requirements are considered
purely in the context of how many candidates should be presented to voters for
election by universal suffrage. The options given by the Government are mechanisms
allowing for:
53.1. ten or more CE candidates;
53.2. up to eight CE candidates; or
53.3. only two to four CE candidates.
54. In our view, this presentation of nomination proposals is yet another attempt by the
Government to create confusion over the issue. By talking about eight or even ten or
more candidates, the Government effectively seeks to create fears that voters may be
swamped with too many (and sometimes frivolous) CE candidate choices. These
fears are, in our view, unfounded.
55. If we take the Government’s presentation of issues at face value, then the current
nomination mechanism for CE candidates allow for up to eight candidates. Sounds
like a lot? Well, the fact is this. For the 1997 CE selection, there were four
candidates nominated. In 2003 and 2005, there was only one candidate. And even in
2007, where there were two candidates, there was great difficulty in securing the
necessary nominations for a second candidate to run for the position. This shows
clearly that a mechanism allowing for up to eight candidates will inevitably end up
producing substantially less candidates.
56. On the other hand, proposals to limit the maximum number of potential candidates to
only a few (say two to four) have a number of drawbacks:
56.1. As noted above, even a system that allows for up to eight candidates can lead
to difficulties nominating more than one eligible candidate.
56.2. Limiting the number of eligible candidates through mechanisms such as only
letting two candidates with the highest number of nominations could
potentially allow for collusion between like-minded political groups to ensure
that only their favoured candidates are put up for election. This would mean
that voters are not being given a real choice between candidates with different
views and perspectives.
57. Taking all these points together, we are firmly of the view that the nomination
threshold for a CE candidate must be sufficiently low to enable voters to have a real
choice at elections. If experience is anything to go by, this would mean a percentage
threshold that is even lower than that which currently prevails. This is nothing more
than a proposal to ensure that, in practice, there will be more than one CE candidate,
and that there can likely be a diversity of views advocated by the candidates. It is not,
as the Government might alarmingly put it, a “ten or more candidates” option.
E. MODELS FOR LEGCO ELECTIONS BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
58. As with CE elections, we have already outlined in earlier sections why Hong Kong is
ready for universal suffrage, and that this should happen by 2012. In this chapter, we
will set out our position on why FCs should be abolished in favour of true universal
suffrage for all LegCo seats.
FCs’ alleged positives – the myths
59. In the Green Paper, the Government has highlighted a number of alleged advantages
of retaining FCs, and how FCs can be retained and still be consistent with universal
suffrage. Let us examine each of these in turn.
The necessity of FCs as specialists
60. First, the Government claims that FCs “have brought the voices of the business and
professional sectors into LegCo and have, through their expertise, assisted LegCo in
carrying out its legislative function and in monitoring the Government’s work. FC
members have made contributions to the community.”
61. We believe that this assertion is misleading. It may be said that FC members have
brought expertise to LegCo and have contributed to the community. However, that is
beside the point.
62. There is simply no need for professional and business experts to have their specially
“reserved” positions for them in LegCo. Professional and business groups from all
walks of life routinely make submissions to the Government on issues of interest to
them. The Professional Commons is but one example of this, as are the various
labour groups, chambers of commerce, and various profession-specific bodies.
63. Indeed, the Government rarely, if ever, proceeds with a major policy or legislative
proposal without first consulting all the relevant specialist stakeholders. And even
after draft legislation reaches LegCo, these same specialist groups are called upon to
testify and assist LegCo in its deliberations. To that extent, FCs represent an
unnecessary duplication of efforts.
64. Further, there is nothing to stop members of business and professional groups from
running for directly elected seats in LegCo in order to advance their agenda. In many
democracies, political parties advocating ideologically conservative policies are often
comprised of members of such groups. And they often win majorities in their
respective legislatures, thus giving their agenda popular legitimacy.
65. By contrast, the reservation of seats for FCs is not only unfair and can create societal
conflicts (as will be explained in more detail later). Even at the level of providing
specialist expertise, the retention of FCs inevitably leads to relatively poorer policies
and legislation:
65.1. By being disproportionately represented (when combined with their fellow
specialists’ share of seats won in geographical constituencies), there is less of
an incentive for special interests represented by FCs to consider their
proposals fully and obtain public support before they are passed in LegCo.
65.2. Thus, there is a greater risk that points of difficulties or concerns in relation to
these specialists’ agenda which could arise from any widespread public debate
may not surface until after legislation is set in stone. This means that pieces of
legislation are likely to be less refined or popularly legitimate as they
otherwise could be if there was a need to win public support.
66. We therefore believe that retaining FCs is not only unnecessarily for the preservation
of specialist voices in LegCo, but also leads to poorer law-making.
FCs’ role in maintaining balance
67. Second, the Green Paper alleges that “FCs can meet the interests of different sectors
of society, which is consistent with the principle of ‘balanced participation’.”
68. Our query on this assertion is: balance between and against what?
68.1. If the “balance” refers to that as between different political ideologies, then the
best reflection of that would be through directly elected geographical
constituencies. Popular participation ensures the widest possible reflection of
public opinion.
68.2. If the phrase means “balance” between different sectors of society, then FCs
are definitely the wrong way to go about it. FCs are necessarily arbitrary as to
what specialist groups are represented, and which ones are not. Certainly no
“balance” there. In addition and as we have already noted earlier, members of
FCs are already represented in geographical constituencies and can win
popular legitimacy through this method. In this context, FCs in fact create an
imbalance in favour of sector-specific special interests.
68.3. Most ominously, it appears that the notion of “balance” can also be seen as
that between privileged groups with positions reserved for them, as against the
general public, as a means for avoiding allegedly “populist” policies. If this is
the meaning of balance, then it goes to the heart of our objections-in-principle
to the retention of FCs, including:
(a) Unfairness : allowing certain groups to have effectively “two bites at
the cherry” through both FCs and geographical constituencies is
inherently unfair. This entrenches narrow sectoral interests to the
detriment of wider public interest. Further, one is effectively insulting
the intelligence of much of the Hong Kong population by suggesting
that only certain groups are “good” enough to run Hong Kong. This is
inconsistent with the image of Hong Kong being a mature, open and
sophisticated world city.
(b) Social conflict : with the unfairness inevitably comes resentment by
those who are locked out of an opportunity to elect majorities in
LegCo. Rather than ensuring “reasonable” policies (as in the case of
many democracies where political groups tend to stick to the “middle
ground”), the maintenance of FCs merely encourages those left out of
the system to pursue more radical ideas in order to be heard. Such
radical tendencies inevitably encourage social and sectoral conflicts,
rather than “balance”.
(c) Inferior legislation : we repeat here the point made earlier about the
disadvantages of the advancement of sectoral interests without winning
over the public.
69. We are firmly of the view that far from promoting “balanced participation”, the
maintenance of FCs entrench and encourage further imbalance in our political system.
Objections to the abolitions of FCs?
70. Third, the Government suggests that “abolition of FCs altogether is bound to meet
with objections from among different sectors of the community and their
representatives in LegCo, and it will be difficult to reach consensus on the issue.”
71. With respect, this is an altogether facetious argument:
71.1. Whilst the abolition of FCs may face objections, the retention of FCs is also
being objected to by many sectors of society.
71.2. If anything, if consistent opinion poll results over many years are anything to
go by, then there is actually more of a consensus for the abolition of FCs than
for their retention.
71.3. If the objections by some is a valid reason for not doing something, the there
are many things that perhaps the Government should not have done. This
ranges from the setting up of the Independent Commission against Corruption
in the 1970s (objections from the police and some public servants), to the
controversial recent demolition of Queen’s Pier (objections from many sectors
of the public).
72. We believe that not only is the mere fact of some objections to the abolition of FCs
not a valid reason for not doing so, but that their abolition would have more consensus
than their retention.
F. HONG KONG: IT’S TIME
73. In the preceding sections, we explained our understanding of what universal
suffrage is about. We showed why Hong Kong is ready and is in need of
universal suffrage as soon as possible. We demonstrated the paramount
importance of a truly democratic procedure for nominating CE candidates to
ensure genuine choice for the people of Hong Kong. We pointed out the
problems with maintaining FCs in LegCo. And, above all, we exposed the
intended or unintended attempts by the Government to create unnecessary
confusion around what are, essentially, simple issues.
74. And what are these simple issues? Here are our own set of concluding
questions for consideration:
74.1. Are Hong Kongers too to choose their own representatives?
74.2. Are fake choices preferable to no choice or to genuine choice?
74.3. Do certain groups or sectors have any god-given rights to enjoy a
monopoly over political power?
74.4. Are undemocratic places denying its people the right to universal
suffrage more likely to provide for better representation of a wide
cross-section of society, and protect the notion of free, open capitalist
economies?
75. If, like us, you believe that the answers to each of these questions are “No”,
then these are the inescapable conclusions. It’s time Hong Kongers are no
longer treated as political imbeciles. It’s time for Hong Kongers to be given
genuine choices over their representatives. It’s time for Hong Kongers to get
true competition in the political scene and not put up with a political
monopoly. It’s time for Hong Kongers to have representatives that truly
represent their diverse views, and exercise public political rights in the same
way they now enjoy private economic rights.
76. And, it’s time for Hong Kongers to enjoy real universal and equal suffrage.
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